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Protecting the Golden Goose:
Canadian Union Security Agreements
and Competitiveness in the Age of
NAFTA
On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment1 (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada and Mexico
took effect, eliminating most tariffs between the three countries,
and effectively stripping away economic protectionism for each
nation's domestic interests.2 The United States and Canada had
already entered into the Free Trade Agreement in 1988, beginning
a process of elimination of tariff barriers between the two nations,
which eventually culminated in the NAFTA accord.3 The destruc-
tion of economic borders has increased competition as each
province and state tries to attract new and better jobs to employ its
citizens. In the Southeastern United States and Mexico, businesses
have been increasingly attracted by the prospect of "right-to-work"
laws. Right-to-work laws prevent union security clauses from
becoming part of a collective bargaining agreement, even if freely
negotiated between the employer and the union.4
Presently, no Canadian provinces have enacted right-to-work
laws; most employers must provide mandatory dues check-off' for
all employees within a unionized bargaining unit, effectively
mandating agency shops.6 In fact, Canadian legislatures, both
1. Betty Southard Murphy, NAFTA 's North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation: The Present and the Future, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 403 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Bruce Campbell, Free Trade: Year 3, CANADIAN DIMENSION, Jan.-Feb.
1992, at 5, available in WESTLAW, TRD&IND Library.
4. Susan Nokes, Special Report: Doing Business in the USA: South Carolina
a Magnet for Business, FIN. POST, Sept. 28, 1996, at 35. See also Campbell supra
note 3.
5. See infra text accompanying note 44. A dues check-off provision in a
collective bargaining agreement requires the employer to withhold union dues for
all employees within the bargaining unit irrespective of which employees are union
members; those employees who refuse to authorize the employer to withhold the
dues must be terminated. See Milltronics Ltd. v. U.E., Local 567 [19801 27 L.A.C.
(2d) 349 (Ont.).
6. Neville Nankivell, 'Right to Work' Laws Should be Introduced in Canada:
Flexible Labor Regimes Create Jobs, FIN. POST, Mar. 2, 1996, at 18 [hereinafter
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provincial and federal, have passed laws making closed-7 and
union-shops8 legal as well.9 In addition, the Supreme Court of
Canada has approved the use of such security agreements as not
conflicting with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. °
The strict union security clauses legally employed in Canada
place its businesses at a disadvantage when competing with U.S.
and Mexican firms in the North American Free Trade Zone.1 As
a result, it is the contention of this Comment that Canadian
provinces are experiencing, and will continue to experience, a
severe decline in manufacturing jobs and production as employers
flee to a more business-friendly atmosphere, spurring those
provinces to do through political means what could not be achieved
through Canadian courts: legislate right-to-work laws and end the
closed- and union-shops.
This Comment will discuss in Part I the legal aspects of both
Canadian and American security agreements, including past
legislative and judicial alterations of the enforcement of these
agreements. Part II will discuss the changes Canadian labor unions
have undergone as a result of the Free Trade Agreement with the
United States and the NAFTA Accord with the United States and
Mexico. Finally, Part III will consider the political changes
occurring on the Canadian political landscape that may signal the
end of the exceptionally permissive nature of Canadian labor law
on this issue. 2
'Right to Work' Laws]; Neville Nankivell, Tilting Towards Unions Will be Costly:
Growth Depends on Less Power for Labor, FIN. POST, Sept. 5, 1996, at 13
[hereinafter Tilting Towards Unions]. An agency shop is one where a mandatory
dues check-off is part of the collective bargaining contract. See Milltronics Ltd.
v. U.E. Local 567 [1980] 27 L.A.C. (2d) 349 (Ont.).
7. A closed-shop agreement is one in which any person hired by the
employer into the bargaining unit must, at the time of hiring, be in good standing
with the union which represents that bargaining unit. See Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers, International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407
(1976).
8. A union-shop agreement requires that the employer may hire nonmem-
bers, but after some specified period of time, the worker must become a member
of the representative union. Id.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 17-26.
10. Lavigne v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union [1991], 81 D.L.R. (4th)
545.
11. See Nankivell, Tilting Towards Unions, supra note 6.
12. This Comment will focus primarily on what Leo Troy calls "Old
Unionism," that is, private sector unionism. Leo Troy, Big Labor's Big Problems,
87 Bus. Soc'y REv. 49 (1993). Mr. Troy believes that, when compared, Canadian
private sector union density parallels the decline of American private union
density, but with a lag time. See Leo Troy, Market Forces and Union Decline: A
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I. Comparative Treatment of Union Security Provisions in
Canada and the United States
Unions seek to maintain their existence against a myriad of
obstacles, including lack of employee solidarity, rival unions, and
employer resistance. To meet these challenges, unions strive to
achieve 100% membership of the employees in represented
bargaining units. 3 Unions long ago recognized that in order to
achieve a high level of membership, some kind of employer
cooperation must be in place to ensure that, at the very least, it can
receive dues from a significant portion of a bargaining unit;
optimally, the union seeks to require membership as a condition of
employment. 4 Such clauses within collective bargaining agree-
ments constitute security agreements.
A. Canada
Canadian labor law is largely controlled by the provinces, with
the exception of a small percentage of workers in government-regu-
lated industries15 and the influence of the federally proposed
Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act.16 Each of the
provinces has enacted a union security provision: Alberta,"
British Columbia," Manitoba, 9 New Brunswick,' Ontario,2'
Saskatchewan,2 2 Newfoundland,' Prince Edward Island,24 Nova
Response to Paul Weiler, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1992). It is the contention of
this Comment that this "lag time" is not due to shifts in industry makeup, as Mr.
Troy suggests, but rather shifts in public perception, which set in motion legislative
changes altering the legality of closed and union shops.
13. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1064
(12th ed. 1996).
14. Id.
15. Dennis R. Maki, Canada's Labor Laws: Where Do We Stand? (Visited
Dec. 3,1996) <http'J/www.fraserinstitute.ca/Events/RightToWork/maki.html#Top>.
16. Todd A. Smith, A Comparative Analysis: The Effect of American and
Canadian Labor Laws and Economic Conditions on Union Participation, 24 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 691, 698-99 (1991).
17. Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A., ch. 167, § 80(2) (1955).
18. British Columbia Labour Relations Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 212, § 9(1)(a) (1979).
19. Manitoba Labour Relations Act, R.S.M., ch. 75, § 68(3) (1972).
20. New Brunswick Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B., ch. 124, § 5(1) (1952).
21. Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. 228, §§ 46(1)(a), 137-51 (1980).
22. Trade Union Act, S.S., ch. 259, § 36(1) (1978). In Saskatchewan, some
employers must include a security agreement in all collective bargaining
agreements. See also E. E. Palmer, Union Security and the Individual Worker, 15
U. TORONTO L.J. 336 (1963-64).
23. Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, NFLD. R.S. ch. 258, § 5(1) (1952).
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Scotia,25 and Quebec. 26 Each of these statutes provides that
employers may enter into enforceable security agreements with
unions, either of the closed- or union-shop type.27
Some union shops have been mandated by provincial govern-
ments; for example, membership in the Ontario Teacher's Federa-
tion (OTF) is mandated by the Teaching Profession Act.' The
Act requires all Ontario teachers to become a member in, and pay
dues to, one of the five affiliated associations grouped under the
OTF; refusal to join one results in discharge.29
The closed shop agreement has been challenged by Canadian
workers as violating Section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Charter), which guarantees the right of free association
to all Canadians. 3 In Re Tomen et al. and Federation of Women
Teachers' Associations of Ontario (Tomen), an Ontario teacher,
Margaret Tomen, was required, by the standing collective bargain-
ing agreement, to join the Federation of Women Teachers'
Association of Ontario (FWTAO), one of the five associated
unions of the OTF. In a consolidated case, John Snow was
likewise required to join the Ontario English Catholic Teacher's
Association (OECTA).32 Both teachers refused to join, and
appealed to the Ontario High Court of Justice, despite the fact that
since 1944 Section 4 of the Teaching Profession Act of Ontario has
required teachers to be a member of one of the five affiliated
unions.33 While much of Judge Ewaschuk's decision concerned
which of the five affiliates Ms. Tomen and Mr. Snow were required
to join, essential to the decision was the Judge's conclusion that,
while membership in the OTT and one of the five affiliated
organizations is mandated by the legislature, this does not subject
24. Prince Edward Island Labour Relations Act, STATS. R.S.P.E.I., ch. 18, § 7
(1962).
25. Trade Union Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 475, § 14 (1989).
26. Quebec Labour Code, R.S.Q., ch. C-27 (1977).
27. See, e.g., Arlington Crane Serv. Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour) [1988]
56 D.L.R. (4th) 209, 67 O.R. (2d) 225, 13 A.W.C.S. (3d) 168; Re Bhindi [1986] 29
D.L.R. (4th) 47. In January, 1988, 1.4 percent of all employees covered by
agreements of 500 employees or more in Canada were covered under closed shop
provisions. See Maki, supra note 15.
28. Teaching Profession Act, R.S.O., ch. 495, § 4 (1980) [hereinafter Teaching
Profession Act].
29. Id.
30. Re Tomen and Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario
[1987] 43 D.L.R. (4th) 255, 6 A.W.C.S. (3d) 177, 61 O.R. (2d) 489.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; Teaching Profession Act, supra note 28.
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the internal operations of those organizations to the Charter of
Rights of Freedoms.34 Instead, despite the presence of the
closed-shop, the workings of the mandated organization was
deemed to be outside the scope of the government and therefore
beyond the reach of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.35
Closed shops have also been attacked because they violate
religious freedoms guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms. In Re Bhindi, the British Columbia Court of Appeals
considered a religious objection to the payment of union dues
under a closed-shop provision within a collective bargaining
agreement.36 The court held that the inclusion of such a provision
in a collective bargaining agreement was considered private action,
and therefore the Charter did not apply to the parties.37 A similar
pre-Charter case involved a union-shop provision where, after
eighteen months of refusing to join the International Association
of Machinists, the employee was fired by the employer.38 The
employee then claimed a religious exemption to the requirement.39
The court in Mostert v. International Association of Machinists ruled
that the employee was bound by the collective agreement, and the
discharge was proper.'
In British Columbia, union-shops have even been created by
judicial caveat. In Re K Mart Canada Ltd. and UEC.W., Loc.
1518, a union sought mediation between itself and the employer
when negotiations over the inclusion of a union-shop provision
reached an impasse culminating in a strike.41 The employer was
prepared to provide a check-off provision conforming to the Rand
Formula,4 2 but not to a union-shop provision requiring all new
employees to join the union.43 The mediator, Judge V. L. Ready,
ruled that because the union demonstrated its resoluteness after
34. Re Tomen, 43 D.L.R. (4th) 255.
35. Id.
36. Re Bhindi [1986] 29 D.L.R. (4th) 47.
37. Id. But see Vandermeulen v. Manitoba (Manitoba Labour Board) [1988]
48 D.L.R. (4th) 714, 9 A.C.W.S. (3d) 27 (providing that legislation which
specifically provides an exemption for employees refusing to pay dues on religious
grounds must be enforced-Manitoba Labour Relations Act,. R.S.M., ch. 75, § 68
(1972)).
38. Mostert v. International Ass'n of Machinists Vancouver Lodge 692 [1968]
1 D.L.R. (3d) 191.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Re K Mart Ltd. and U.F.C.W., Loc. 1518 [1993] 37 L.A.C. (4th) 412.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 45-51.
43. Re K Mart Ltd., 37 L.A.C. at 415.
19971
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fourteen months of striking to include the provision, under B.C. law
he was bound to rule that the inevitable outcome of negotiation
would have been the inclusion of the union-shop provision as
proposed by the union.' Thus, the union-shop provision was
mandated as part of the collective bargaining agreement. The
employer argued that such a mandate would breach Section 2(d) of
the Charter.4" The judge held, however, that since both the union
and the employer "agreed to the process of mediation/arbitration,
it is not open to the employer to say that what they have agreed to
do by way of private agreement is unconstitutional."'  Again, the
contractual nature of the collective bargaining agreement was held
to be outside the protection of the Charter.
A check-off provision in a collective bargaining agreement
provides the union with a steady source of revenue without regard
to the actual union membership level in a given bargaining unit.47
The union dues collected under such an agreement may be
expended by the union on whatever operating and discretionary
costs it incurs.' In Manitoba49 and Quebec, ° union check-off
clauses (agency shops) are mandated for all employees who opt not
to join a certified union, regardless of the desires of the union,
employer, or employee. In Saskatchewan,"1 Newfoundland 2 and
Ontario, 3 agency shops may be created and enforced at the
unilateral request of the union, without entering into the bargaining
process.5 4 All other provinces permit such clauses to be included
in a collective bargaining agreement; if not included in the
collective bargaining agreement, union dues check-off is voluntary
only.55
Because of the coercive nature of closed- and union-shops, and
agency shops created by a mandatory dues check-off provision,
several challenges have been made to the existing security agree-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Milltronics Ltd. v. U.E. Local 567 [1980] 27 L.A.C. (2d) 349 (Ont.).
48. See Re Treasury Board and Public Service Alliance of Canada [1987] 28
L.A.C. (3d) 38.
49. Manitoba Labour Relations Act, R.S.M., ch. 75, § 68(3) (1972).
50. Permitted by judicial decision first in Price Bros. v. Letarte, [1953] Que.
Q.B. 307.
51. Trade Union Act, S.S., ch. 259, § 36(1) (1978).
52. Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, NFLD. R.S., ch. 258, § 5(1) (1952).
53. Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., ch. 228, §§ 46(1)(a), 137-51 (1960).
54. Id.
55. See Maki, supra note 15.
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ment regime. The first of these challenges produced the so-called
"Rand Formula," named for Judge Ivan Rand, who authored the
opinion affirming the legality of the agency shop, and requiring
nonmembers to pay dues regardless of the collective bargaining
agreement.56 The Rand Formula attempted to strike a balance
between the economic necessity of the unions and the rights of
association of the workers.5 7 In doing so, the Formula squeezes
out the opportunity for individual negotiation between the
employee and the employer, funneling these issues through the
58union.
It is important to note that, although nonmembers must pay
union dues under the Rand Formula, nonmembers may ignore
union directives, such as an order not to cross a picket line, with
impunity.59 Proponents of the Rand Formula (and of security
provisions in general) argue that the system of collective bargaining
increases the power and influence of the individual worker by
permitting collective action;' the check-off provision merely
assures that there is no "free lunch," and ensures that the union has
sufficient economic resources to carry out the bargaining and
grievance processes." Thus, since 1946, agency shops have been
a part of the Canadian landscape: mandated in most provinces,
legal in all.
The most significant legal attack on the Rand Formula since
it was created occurred in 1986. Ontario engineering instructor and
former political candidate Mervyn Lavigne challenged the Ontario
Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) on the grounds that
mandatory union dues check-off, where OPSEU expends those
dues supporting political causes opposed to the employee's personal
beliefs, violates Section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Free-
56. Re Ford Motor Co. of Canada and the Int'l Union U.A.A. & A.I.W. of
America (U.A.W.-C.I.O.) [1946] 1 CCH Lab. Law Rep. 2150. Note that all
provinces have not adopted the Rand Formula as mandated nor have all adopted
the discretion of the union alone; the Formula must be statutorily or judicially
adopted to become binding. See Maki, supra note 15.
57. Diane Francis, Rand Formula Wreaks Havoc on Canadian Workers, FIN.
POST, May 26, 1994, at 17; Palmer, supra note 22, at 337-39.
58. See Palmer, supra note 22, at 337.
59. See Maid, supra note 15, at 1.
60. Id.
61. Id.; Vicki Barnett, Lower Wages Feared From Work-Rights Law,
CALGARY HERALD, May 2, 1995, at B4, A Bombshell for Organized Labour.
Alberta's Unions Battle for Survival Against Right-to-Work Legislation, W. REP.,
SEPTEMBER 4, 1995, AT 16, available in WESTLAW, CBCA LIBRARY.
199"7]
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doms. 62 Mr. Lavigne crossed a picket line during a strike in 1984.
Because of the collective bargaining agreement, his employer could
not pay him, and, because he was not a union member, he did not
qualify for strike pay.63 Backed by a conservative group, the
National Citizen's Coalition (NCC), Mr. Lavigne sued, arguing that
the $338 per year in union dues which he paid included almost $2
which went to political causes he opposed-namely, the New
Democratic Party (NDP), striking British coal miners, and women's
rights groups.' The Ontario Supreme Court agreed with Mr.
Lavigne in an opinion by Justice John White.65 The Judge
indicated that OPSEU contributed at least $1.8 million to the NDP,
$81,800 to disarmament groups and $3100 to pro-choice groups.66
Judge White held that contributions to these groups violated Mr.
Lavigne's right of association guaranteed by Section 2(d) of the
Charter.67
The Supreme Court of Canada granted certiorari and ruled
that the Charter did not prevent unions from using compulsory
dues of its members for causes to which those employees object.'
The Supreme Court first ruled that, because the payment of dues
was mandated by government legislation, action by a private union
could still constitute government action, and therefore the protec-
tion of the Charter applied.69 The support of causes outside the
bargaining relationship was also held to be a violation of Mr.
Lavigne's freedom of association (or rather, his freedom not to
associate) under Section 2(d) of the Charter.70 However, Justice
Gerald LaForest wrote that the limitation on Mr. Lavigne's
62. Lavigne v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union [19911 81 D.L.R. (4th)
545. Kevin Scanlon, Challenging a Union Tradition, MACLEAN'S, July 21, 1986,
at 43.
63. Id.
64. Id.; Canada: Debate on Rights of Unions to Decide Use of Dues Reopens,
FIN. POST, June 9, 1989.
65. Lavigne v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union [1986], 86 C.L.L.C.
14,036, 55 O.R. (2d) 449, 29 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (H.C.).
66. Id.
67. Id. The Ontario High Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision;
Mr. Lavigne appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
68. Lavigne v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union [1991], 91 C.L.L.C.
14,029, 3 O.R. (3d) 511, 81 D.L.R. (4th) 545, 126 N.R. 161, 4 C.R.R. (2d) 193, 48
O.A.C. 241 (S.C.C.), affirming (sub nom. O.P.S.E.U. v. Lavigne) [1989], 89
C.L.L.C. 14,011, 31 O.A.C. 40, 67 O.R. (2d) 536, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 474, 37 C.R.R.
193.
69. Lavigne v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union [19911 27 A.C.W.S. (3d)
795.
70. Id.
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freedom of association was justified under Section 1 of the Charter,
and was "rationally connected to the goals of permitting unions to
participate in the broader political, economic, and social debates of
society" at large, and contributed to furthering democracy in the
workplace.71 The court held that adding support to the NDP was
"relevant" to the union's obligation to support its members.72 The
court decided the impairment on Mr. Lavigne's freedom was
minimal, while the "opting-out formula" would cause serious
damage to the financial base and spirit of solidarity requisite to the
functioning of unionism. 3  Thus, Mr. Lavigne's appeal was
dismissed, and the Rand Formula had been affirmed as the
appropriate method to protect unionism in Canada.74
Predictably, the reaction to the decision in Lavigne v. OPSEU
was mixed. Some commentators expressed alarm and disappoint-
ment; a spokesman from the NCC, the group that sponsored Mr.
Lavigne in his lawsuit, told reporters that, "The highest court [in
Canada] thinks it's quite all right if a union forces workers against
their will to support political causes and parties they disagree
with., 75 Nancy Riche, spokeswoman for the Canadian Labour
Congress, said the court had ruled that unions were free to use
dues to promote social causes.76 Viewed in either way, the
Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that the Rand Formula,
however applied by provincial law, is safe from attack on constitu-
tional grounds.
Overall, it is clear that the availability of the Rand Formula,
used in many instances against the will of both employers and
non-union employees, and the legality of closed- and union-shop
provisions, serve to protect union membership levels and decrease
competitiveness in labor costs across the Canadian provinces.
Within Canada, little opportunity exists for employers to lower the
cost of labor through relocation or individual bargaining in order
to bring down domestic or export prices. Until 1988, tariffs allowed
Canadian firms to compete against one another in an effectively
closed system. How this labor regime works in the NAFTA era is
71. Lavigne v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union [1991] 27 A.C.W.S. (3d)
795.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Laurie Watson, Court Upholds Use of Union Dues for Political Causes,
U.P.I., June 27, 1991.
76. Id.
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a question of extreme importance to the economies of all the
Canadian provinces.
B. The United States
Unlike Canada, the United States has experienced a gradual
chipping away of the legality of union security provisions. When
the original Wagner Act of 1935 was passed, the language of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act specifically made the closed- and
union-shop a legal provision of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.77 However, after World War II ended, Congress felt the
need to curb some of the abuses (and some of the legitimate
power) of the unions.78 To do so, the Taft-Hartley amendments
of 1947 were passed.7 9 Among the changes enacted was a prohibi-
77. 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a)(3) (1935).
78. See COx, supra note 13, at 85.
79. Id. at 86; 29 U.S.C.S. § 158 as amended.
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tion on the use of the closed-shop.80  The union-shop and
agency-shop remained legal, but not for long.
In National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. General Motors
Corporation,"' the Supreme Court stated that, "[tihe prevailing
administrative and judicial view under the Wagner Act was or came
to be that the proviso to Section 8(3) [sic] covered both the closed
and union shop.... The National Labor Relations Board construed
the proviso as shielding from unfair labor practice charge less
severe forms of union-security arrangements than the closed or the
union shop."' 2  Essentially, the Court ruled that, though an
agreement could require "membership" in a union, "the burdens of
membership upon which the employment may be conditioned are
expressly limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly
dues. ... Membership is whittled down to its financial core."'83
80. Compare the wording of the original § 8(a):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (3) by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing
in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require
as a condition of employment membership therein if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided
in section 9(a) in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit
covered by such agreement when made.
29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a) (repealed 1947) (emphasis in original). As revised, § 8(a)
reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (3) by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing
in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require
as a condition of employment membership therein on or after
the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or
the effective date of such agreement, whichever is later, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees as
provided in section 9(a) in the appropriate collective-bargaining
unit covered by such agreement when made.
29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a) (emphasis in original).
81. National Labor Relations Bd. (NLRB) v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S.
734 (1963).
82. Id. at 739.
83. Id. at 742.
1997]
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Hence, following NLRB v. General Motors, only the agency shop
and "fair share" arrangements were available to unions wishing to
maintain their membership rosters and financial resources.
The agency shop remained an enforceable and viable practice
in the United States until, arguably, 1988. In that year, Communi-
cations Workers of America v. Beck' 4 severely limited the enforce-
ability of the agency shop; its effects are still being debated.5 In
an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court held that the
"financial core" protected by the language Section 8(a)(3) and
NLRB v. General Motors referred only to union activities "germane
to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment."86  The Court analogized to its 1961 decision in
Machinists v. Street,8' which concerned Section 2 of the Railway
Labor Act (RLA).88 In Machinists v. Street, the Court had ruled
that Section 2, identical in all material respects to Section 8(a)(3)
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), prevented the use
of union dues of nonmembers beyond the core functions of the
union.89 The core functions were those "necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive
[bargaining] representative."9  The Court applied its reasoning
and holding to agency shops under the NLRA as well as the
RLA,9 with the effect of preventing unions from collecting
mandatory dues from nonmembers and spending those dues on any
activity outside the sphere of collective bargaining or grievance
arbitration.92
The effects of Beck are not immediately appreciable. On
remand, Mr. Beck was refunded 100 percent of his dues paid plus
interest, and was released from making any further dues pay-
ments.93 To date, no bright-line rule or percentage has been
established to determine the legal liability nonmembers have to
84. Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
85. Cf. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the
National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's
Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51 (1990).
86. Beck, 487 U.S. at 745.
87. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
88. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
89. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 764.
90. Beck, 487 U.S. at 752 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 at
447-48 (1984)).
91. Id. at 746-47.
92. Id. at 762-63.
93. See Raymond J. LaJeunesse Jr., Unions Dues and Politics: What the Courts
Ruled, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 1996, at A23.
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unions protected by a valid agency shop security clause.94 Regard-
less of post-mortems, the effect of the Beck decision has been to
further weaken the use of security clauses in American collective
bargaining agreements, leaving only "fair share" security clau-
ses-which require the employer to withhold a proportionate
amount of wages corresponding to "core" union dues from
nonmember paychecks, to be kept by the employer.95
Unions in the United States face a further barrier in attaining
100% membership: right-to-work laws. Section 14(b) of the
NLRA states that, "nothing in this Act shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is
prohibited by State or Territorial law."96 Before the Taft-Hartley
Amendments outlawed the use of security agreements which
compelled union membership or required the payment of dues,
twelve states had enacted right-to-work laws.97 Today, twenty-one
states have right-to-work laws.98  In these twenty-one states,
containing one-third of the population of the United States,99 no
union security agreement, from closed shop to fair share, can be
enforced. The constitutionality of right-to-work laws was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co.," and the ability of state courts to enforce the
provisions of their own right-to-work laws was affirmed in Retail
Clerks v. Schermerhorn.1 1
As a result of the enactment of right-to-work laws in
twenty-one states, and the progressive weakening of the enforce-
ability of security agreements throughout the United States,
American unions are at a substantial disadvantage to their
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 29 U.S.C.S. § 164(b) (1988).
97. Cox, supra note 13, at 1090; see also Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 1625
v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963) (prohibiting the agency shop under
right-to-work legislation).
98. Those states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and
Wyoming.
99. See Neville Nankivell, Labour Codes Stifle Business Flexibility:
Right-to-Work Rules Gain Popularity, FIN. POST, Sept. 14, 1995, at 15.
100. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949).
101. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
1997]
606 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3
Canadian counterparts in achieving 100% union membership (or
even 100% dues collection). While this results in a significant
hampering in the organizational ability of the labor movement in
America, many see this as a development that has enabled the
United States, and the right-to-work states in particular, to compete
more successfully for new and relocating businesses."° Following
the signing of the NAFTA agreement, this competitiveness in the
American South, and the corresponding inability to compete
experienced by Canadian firms, may force Canadian legislatures to
take action.
II. Canadian Labor in the Era of Free Trade
The passage of NAFTA, and the Free Trade Agreement
before it, was a difficult and contentious matter in both the United
States and Canada." While one of the express goals of the
NAFTA accord was the protection, enhancement, and enforcement
of basic worker rights,"°a NAFTA also had the effect of creating
the largest free-trade area in the world, and one which, it was
contended, would lead to job losses to Mexico. Export production
of the Canadian gross domestic product has risen from twenty-four
percent in 1991 to thirty-seven percent last year. 5 Canadian and
U.S. trade has risen seventy-five percent since the implementation
of the Free Trade Agreement.106 Steven Krug, general manager
of a Canadian-owned plant in Georgia claims, "There is little doubt
that the growing integration of the North American Market under
NAFTA has also had a large impact. ... It's as if the border
doesn't exist. ' ' 1°  Following the NAFTA accord's inception,
Canadian and Mexican two-way trade soared from $2714 billion to
$4218 billion."° Although Canadian exports soared under both
NAFTA and the Free Trade Agreement, many jobs were lost to
102. See infra notes 109-14.
103. For an interesting account of NAFTA passage in the United States, see
Ken Jennings & Jeffrey W. Steagell, Unions and NAFTA's Legislative Passage:
Confrontation and Cover, 21 LAB. STUD. J. 61 (1996).
104. Murphy, supra note 1, at 404 (quoting North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296, at preamble).
105. Stephen Dale, Canada-Globalization: Chretien Joins Chorus of Naysayers,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, May 26, 1996, available in WESTLAW, INTERPS Library.
106. Fazil Mihiar, Student Question of the Month, August 1996 (visited Dec. 3,
1996) <http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/student/qmonth.html#Top>. Canadian trade
with the rest of the world increased only ten percent during this same period. Id
107. Peter Morton, Down South in Dixie: Canadian Companies in Atlanta, FIN.
POST, Mar. 9, 1996, at 6.
108. Mihiar, supra note 106.
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the United States and Mexico, even during the recession of
1988-1992.1°9
A. The Impact of the Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA
The Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA have made it possible
for businesses to take advantage of both cheaper export markets
and cheaper labor markets of the right-to-work states in the
American Southeast. Canada is ranked fourth among foreign
nations in number of headquarters based in the Southeast. 10 The
Financial Post reported this year that Canadian firms have flocked
to the Southeastern United States, lured in part because of the
right-to-work laws found in those states."' The Post describes
the seven states of the U.S. Southeast'12 as having a more
"pro-business attitude" and as actively luring Canadian compa-
nies.1 13
Though most authorities agree that businesses are moving out
of Canada to the United States and Mexico, disagreement exists as
to why this phenomenon has occurred. James Bursey, a consultant
in the "metal-bashing" business, claims that these companies are
moving not because of the ability to do so created by the Free
Trade Agreement, but to escape the restrictive Canadian labor
laws."4
In an era in which international competitiveness, not just
intraprovincial competitiveness, is required, closed and union shops
in Canada are at a significant disadvantage. Nonunionized
manufacturing businesses in Canada experienced a 3.7 percent per
year advantage in job growth over their nonunionized counterparts
in the period from 1980 to 1985.115 Nonunionized companies in
109. See Diane Francis, Salinas Keeps Stiff Upper Lip on Trade Deal, FIN.
POST, May 15, 1993, at S3. Bruce Campbell of Canadian Dimension reports that
over 90,000 jobs were lost over the first thirty months after the Free Trade
Agreement went into effect. Campbell, supra note 3, at 5, 6.
110. Britain, Japan, and Germany rank above Canada. Morton, supra note 107.
111. Id.
112. Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee,
and Alabama. Id.
113. Id.
114. Diane Francis, Union, Government Greed Wreak Economic Havoc, FIN.
PosT, Nov. 14, 1992, at S3. Id. Mr. Bursey gave various accounts of businesses
moving specifically to avoid further "union problems," specifically from Ontario
and B.C. Id.
115. Richard J. Long, The Effect of Unionization on Employment Growth of
Canadian Companies, 46 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 691 (1993). Mr. Long found
a similar "growth gap" for both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing companies.
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nonmanufacturing businesses reported 3.9 percent greater employ-
ment growth over unionized companies in the same period.
1 1 6
This "growth gap" is the result of the lower overall productivity
caused by higher union wages and the goal of union members to
maximize short-term gains.11 7  Industry organizations acknow-
ledge that the fate of unionized companies may be much worse
than slow growth. In a brief to the Canadian government, the
Grocery Products Manufacturers of Canada stated that some
product sectors are simply at a disadvantage with their American
equivalents because comparative U.S. industries were "not as
unionized.""'  Some sources, however, note that while some jobs
and some businesses are relocating because of the lower labor costs
in the United States and Mexico, overall equity investment in
Canada is increasing, indicating that NAFTA and free trade
promote greater efficiency through increased competition and
productivity."9
Financial experts are quick to point to the success of the
American right-to-work states as evidence that union security
agreements are a serious threat to competitiveness.' 2° Neville
Nankivell of the Financial Post states that about three-quarters of
all new high-paying manufacturing jobs created in the U.S. between
1988 and 1993 (the height of the recent recession) were created in
the 21 right-to-work states, despite those states containing only
thirty-five percent of the U.S. population.' Mr. Nankivell notes
that those twenty-one states attracted fifty-seven percent of
investment dollars in new and expanding business facilities."
Many businesses hinge their relocation decisions on state or
provincial labor laws: in a survey conducted by the Fantus
Company, a large industrial relocation firm, half of all businesses
surveyed seeking to relocate stated that they would not even
consider moving to a state unless it had passed a right-to-work
law.'23
The results of his study also confirmed that older firms, rather than larger firms,
tended to experience a greater productivity disadvantage when unionized. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 701.
118. John Ferri, Labor Fears Free Trade to Bring Union-Busting Push from
U.S., TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6, 1988, at A12.
119. Mihlar, supra note 106, at 2.
120. See Neville Nankivell, supra note 99.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. David Kendrick, Economic Development and Right to Work- Case Study:
Idaho (visited Dec. 3,1996) <http'/www.fraserinstitute.ca//RightToWork/Kendrick-
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Other sources challenge the positive impact of NAFTA and
the access to right-to-work labor markets. Unions argued that the
original Free Trade Agreement would undermine the legal
framework that encouraged collective bargaining in Canada. 4
Canadian employers, it was contended, would try to equalize labor
relations with those in the United States." Andrew Jackson, a
senior economist with the Canadian Labor Congress, believes that
the labor costs in Canada, including those incurred because of
strictly enforced security agreements, no longer hurt Canadian
competitiveness since most labor-intensive industries have already
"died" under the NAFTA regime."2  Jackson maintains that
Canada remains competitive despite its labor costs, due to a
devalued Canadian dollar and recent technological investments.1 7
Naturally, with the prevailing wage about $8.25 per hour, workers
in the right-to-work states cannot be considered as loyal as their
Canadian counterparts."2 Jackson believes Canada simply cannot
compete with Mexico for lower wages, and so it is unsound for
Canada to do so, thus implicitly arguing for maintaining wages that
are uncompetitive with nonunionized Mexican and American
businesses. 29
B. Public Discourse in Canadian Politics on Union Security
Agreements
Like any issue so fundamental as employment and the
economy, statutory protection of the ability of unions to bargain for
strict union security agreements has sparked intense debates in
Canada. As Canada continues to live and work under NAFTA,
this debate will likely grow in intensity.
Many sources, particularly within the financial community,
have called for the end of the Rand Formula and the enactment of
2.html#TOP>. A similar study found that 91.3% of businesses reported that the
presence of right-to-work laws have a positive impact on a business looking to
relocate. Id.
124. Ferri, supra note 120, at A12.
125. Id.
126. Dale, supra note 105.
127. Id.
128. Morton, supra note 107, at 6.
129. Dale, supra note 105. In so arguing, Jackson may ignore some facts about
Mexican wage rates. Though Mexican workers do receive lower hourly wages,
when greater fringe benefits, profit-sharing and productivity levels are entered into
the equation, Mexico presents only a thirty-four percent labor cost advantage.
Francis, supra note 109. The rapid expansion of businesses is expected to push
this wage rate up further. Id.
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right-to-work laws. Some argue that certification without a vote,
by simply acquiring a majority of union authorization cards, is a
"backward" practice, for it then binds all employees to become
union members if and when a security agreement is placed into the
collective bargaining agreement."3  Right-to-work laws could
provide a free market for labor, allowing employees to join those
unions providing the best deals and refusing to join unions which
employees perceive to have a negative effect on their employ-
ment.
131
The case of New Zealand is a frequently cited example in
Canadian reflections. In 1991, New Zealand passed the Employ-
ment Contracts Act (ECA), which forbade union security agree-
ments as well as all forms of compulsory unionism.13 1 In the first
forty-two months following the passage of the ECA, union
membership experienced a decline of forty-one percent."
Supporters of this type of legislation link this decrease in member-
ship to New Zealand's corresponding drop in unemployment over
this period from eleven percent to seven percent, reversing the
pre-ECA employment trend of increasing unemployment" 3'
Economic analysis indicates that employment grew fastest in
industries where union membership dropped most rapidly.'35
Canadian analysts see this evidence, coupled with the New Zealand
government's fiscal rebound from a large budget deficit to a
predicted surplus in the future, as evidence of the positive effects
of right-to-work legislation. 36
The debate has heated up in several major Canadian provinces:
130. Garth Turner, Playing Monopoly with Workers' Jobs, CANADIAN Bus.,
Dec. 1995, at 15, available in WESTLAW, TRD&IND Library. It has been
hypothesized that it is this certification process, in which authorization cards may
serve to certify a union in Canada, which creates the greater union representation
in Canada. Smith, supra note 16, at 700.
131. Turner, supra note 130, at 15.
132. Id. Thus, individual employees may select any person or group to
represent their individual employment interests, and there are no representatives
required to represent an entire bargaining unit. Additionally, there is no duty
upon the employer to bargain in good faith with a bargaining agent. Tim
Maloney, Has New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act Increased Employment
and Reduced Wages? (visited Dec. 3, 1996) <http'//www.fraserinstitute.cal/Eve-
ntsfRightToWork/maloney.html#Top>.
133. Maloney, supra note 132.
134. Id.; Turner, supra note 130.
135. Maloney, supra note 13.
136. Turner, supra note 130.
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1. Alberta.-Alberta, with the lowest unionized workforce in
Canada,137 became the first testing ground for right-to-work
legislation in Canada. Because Alberta does not require the Rand
Formula to be in place for all employers, a right-to-work law would
have the effect of requiring open shops.138  In 1995, Provincial
Premier Ralph Klein set up a committee, chaired by former
Conservative labor minister Elaine McCoy, to examine the
potential effects of right-to-work legislation in this province.3 9
The committee reported to the Alberta Economic Development
Authority that there would be no economic advantage in promul-
gating right-to-work legislation." The committee suggested that
unions tend to raise, rather than lower, productivity. 4' The
committee found that right-to-work laws have "little or no impact
on wages and income levels, unemployment rates, or the incidence
of strikes or lockouts."' 42 It also found that right-to-work laws
might cause labor strife in an otherwise peaceful labor-management
relations atmosphere.43
Indeed, the possibility of this legislation being introduced alone
has caused division. " Right-to-work legislation has been called
a "politician's nightmare."145 Many groups, especially the unions
themselves, have been stridently against the legislation. 1 6 Unions
137. Alberta Task Force Finds No Benefit to Right-to Work Laws, FIN. POST,
Dec. 1, 1995, at 19 [hereinafter Alberta Task Force]. Only twenty-four percent of
Alberta's workforce is unionized, with thirteen percent unionization in the private
sector. Id.
138. See Christopher Serres, A Bombshell for Organized Labour: Alberta's
Unions Battle for Survival Against Right-to-Work Legislation, W. REP., Sept. 4,
1995, at 16, available in WESTLAW, CBCA Library.
139. Alberta Task Force, supra note 137, at 19.
140. See Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. "As the committee found no evidence of economic advantage to
right-to-work legislation, and as such legislation may well disrupt Alberta's strong
labour relations, it recommends against passing a RTW bill." Id.
144. See Tom Arnold, Two Sides Split on Right-to-Work Legislation,
EDMONTON J., Aug. 17, 1995, at A7.
145. Serres, supra note 138, at 16.
146. Opposed groups include: the Alberta Federation of Labor. Duncan
Thorne, Small Firms Want Right to Hire Outside Unions; 84% Surveyed Support
End to Closed Shops, EDMONTON J., Sept. 8, 1994, at C4 ("It is beyond me why
anyone would support such legislation... It's like throwing down the gauntlet to
every union," states AFL President Linda Karpowich); the Alberta Union of
Provincial Employees, Arnold, supra note 145; the provincial Liberal Party, Id.
("In reality there aren't the great economic spinoffs the right-to-work proponents
propose," stated Karen Leibovici, Liberals' labor critic); and, the Calgary Labor
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argue the measure would mean the complete destruction of the
fifteen percent of Albertan workforce that is unionized. 147 "It is
the most dangerous attack on working people in Alberta in the
twenty-five-year history of the Tory government," argued Gordon
Christie, executive secretary of the Calgary Labour Council."4
Right-to-work laws are seen as violating the right to contract. 49
For others, while the economic case for right-to-work laws in
Alberta may seem compelling, such legislation is viewed as too
radical a solution.' The Alberta Chamber of Commerce, though
philosophically in favor of the right to work, opposed the proposed
right-to-work legislation.'
While many groups argue that a need to reform exists, and
right-to-work laws are apparently not the favored remedy for many
such groups, the public may support right-to-work legislation. The
Calgary-based Canadians Against Forced Unionism (CAFU) and
the Canadian Federation of Independent Business led, and continue
to lead, the campaign to promote right-to-work legislation.152
CAFU's polling indicates that roughly seventy percent of the
Albertan population favors labor law reform. 3 These organiza-
tions cite the right of the individual worker to choose to belong to
a union as the primary reason for supporting such legislation, rather
Council, Vicki Barnett, Lower Wages Feared from Work-Rights Law, CALGARY
HERALD, May 2, 1995, at B4.
147. Serres, supra note 138.
148. Barnett, supra note 146. Mr. Christie indicated that the 21 right-to-work
states in the United States suffered below average wages, lower unemployment
benefits, lower numbers of people receiving workers' compensation, and lower
workers' compensation payments. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 210-
14.
149. Serres, supra note 138. Edmonton labor lawyer Bob Blakely states that
the union security clause is one negotiated privately between the employer and the
employees' representative, the union. Outlawing these kinds of agreements,
according to Mr. Blakely, would be a "socialist" intervention by government into
private affairs. Id.
150. Lome Gunter, Push Comes to Shove, CALGARY HERALD, Feb. 28, 1996.
Mr. Gunter suggests efforts to make unions more democratic, such as financial
disclosure and reforming decertification procedures serve as better alternatives
over right-to-work laws. Id.; Oh to Be Rid of That Last 15%: Right-to-Work is
Stalled in Alberta, and Could Remain That Way, W. REP., Oct. 30, 1995, at 19,
available in WESTLAW, CBCA Library [hereinafter Oh to Be Rid]. The
Christian Labour Association of Canada supports union reform, but opposes
right-to-work legislation. Id.
151. Alberta Task Force, supra note 137.
152. See Oh to Be Rid, supra note 150; See Thorne, supra note 146.
153. Lumps for Labour: An NCC Off-shoot Takes on Forced Unionism, W.
REP., Mar. 20, 1995, at 19, available in WESTLAW, CBCA Library.
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than appealing to greater economic productivity or competitive-
ness.
154
The Fraser Institute, a Vancouver-based think tank, has taken
a different view by creating a strong economic argument for
right-to-work legislation by comparing the economies of Alberta
and Idaho, a right-to-work state. 5  The Fraser Institute found
that more than 100,000 non-agricultural jobs had been created since
Idaho passed its right-to-work law in 1986.156 Idaho has enjoyed
growth in virtually all major areas of business, with over 5000 new
businesses starting since 1987.57 Idaho's growth in manufacturing
jobs grew at a pace that was the third fastest in the nation,
compared to a drop in manufacturing jobs for a similar period
before the passage of the right-to-work law.15 1 In this same
period, Idaho's personal income growth rate was 71.7 percent, the
highest in the United States and well over the average in
non-right-to-work states at 57.1 percent.159  The Director of
Idaho's Department of Commerce, as well as the Fraser Institute
and many in Alberta and Canada, attributes these economic gains
to the right-to-work legislation passed in Idaho16°
2. Ontario.-Under the Conservative majority of Mike
Harris, Ontario has also begun exploring alternatives to current
labor laws as part of its "Common Sense Revolution., 161 The
Conservative government maintains that some economic reform is
necessary to keep Ontario competitive in the "global competition
for investment."162 Already, the previous administration's Bill 40,
154. Thorne, supra note 146, at C4; Rob Anders of Canadians Against Forced
Unionism: "Nobody should be forced to join a union." Barnett, supra note 146,
at B4.
155. Arnold, supra note 144, at A7.
156. Id. This research has been attacked, notably by Tom Fuller, a researcher
with the Alberta Union of Provincial Employees, as "shabby." Mr. Fuller argues
that Idaho is, in addition to being overwrought with white supremacists, 45th of
50 states in annual pay, 39th of 50 in average personal income, 49th of 50 in
educational investment per student, and 31st of 50 in population health ranking.
Id.
157. Kendrick, supra note 123. Construction jobs in Idaho increased 101%
between 1987 and 1994, compared to a national job growth rate in non-right-no-
work states of just 3.5%. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Safe Delivery, TORONTO SUN, Oct. 6, 1995, at 1; See also Nankivell, supra
note 99.
162. Dale, supra note 105.
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which banned the use of temporary replacement workers during
strikes, has been repealed."63 Bill 7, which was incorrectly charac-
terized as a "right-to-work" law by some labor supporters, sparked
protests across Ontario."6 The bill proposed to eliminate the ban
on replacement workers introduced by Bill 40, required unions to
achieve over fifty percent support, by secret ballot, for certification
or calling a strike, and clarified the decertification procedures.' 6
Reportedly, even some corporate CEOs campaigned against the
provisions of Bill 7, thinking this bill scaled back workers' rights
too far."6 Ontario Labour Minister Elizabeth Witmer stated that
the government has no plans to introduce genuine right-to-work
legislation, and the elimination of the Rand Formula is outside the
authority of the provincial parliament.167 Some writers, however,
maintain that right-to-work legislation is in the Conservative's
future plans,"6 and labor union bosses have promised more
unrest to follow. 69 However, it seems public support for unions
is low in Ontario. 7
3. British Columbia.-In British Columbia, Liberal Premier
Gordon Campbell has promised to change the province's labor laws
to "restore the balance" in labor relations and to improve the
province's economy.' His party has released a statement of
policy, similar to Mike Harris', called "The Courage to
163. Jason Ziedenberg, The Counter Revolution: Is Mike Harris Helping
Regenerate the Ontario Left?, CANADIAN DIMENSION, Apr. 1996, at 6, available
in WESTLAW, TRD&IND Library. Bill 40 banned the use of replacement
workers only when a strike vote achieved over sixty percent support. Geoffrey
Scotton, Canada: The Reality of Bill 40 - Ontario's New Labor Law is All Set to
Roll, FIN. POST, Oct. 19, 1992, at 11.
164. Mr. Ziedenberg characterizes Bill 7 as a right-to-work law. Id. He reports
that on December 11, 1995, 10,000 people took place in a protest in London,
Ontario organized by the Ontario Federation of Labour. Id On January 13, 1996,
30,000 Catholic school teachers marched on Queen's Park in a similar protest. Id.
165. See Safe Delivery, supra note 161.
166. See Ziedenberg, supra note 163. One is at a loss, however, to explain why
corporate CEOs could not simply extend the same protections of Bill 40 through
private arrangement in a collective bargaining agreement.
167. Safe Delivery, supra note 161.
168. Geoff Bickerton, Ontario: Conflict Growing, CANADIAN DIMENSION,
Aug./Sept. 1995, at 24, available in WESTLAW, TRD&IND Library.
169. Brad Evenson, Volatile Labor Climate 'Means Strife' in 1996, VANCOUVER
SUN, Mar. 4, 1996, at A3.
170. See Id
171. Id.
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Change. ' ' 2 This policy statement was intended to be tough on
unions, by restoring secret ballots for certification votes, ending
some closed shop public works, allowing replacement workers
during strikes, and banning secondary boycotts.173 Union leaders
have promised to fight the changes, claiming they would upset the
peaceful nature of B.C.'s labor relations.174  Organizations such
as the Fraser Institute have been vocal in pushing for a more
radical change in the province's laws, with a particular focus on
legislating right-to-work laws.175 The Fraser Institute is troubled
by. the rapid increase in union certifications in British
Columbia,176 and claims that without ambitious reforms, B.C. will
become less competitive and future job growth will slow.177
4. Quebec.-Quebec is among a minority of provinces to
require the Rand Formula as a minimum level of union security if
the union unilaterally requests this protection. This security need
not be won in the bargaining process. Quebec also prevents
employers from hiring permanent or temporary replacement
workers during a strike or lockout.178 Until recently, all construc-
tion workers were required to join a union or obtain a work permit,
which were reportedly difficult to obtain. 179 Wage rates were set
by the provincial government."l
Jocelyn Dumais, a Quebec-based, nonunionized contractor,
organized the Right to Work Association to combat the existing
labor regime.181  Through public protests, unsuccessful court
challenges, and drawing media attention to his campaign, Mr.
172. The Looming Labour-Policy Showdown: NDP and Liberal Pre-Election
Statements Point to Areas of Conflict, B.C. REP., Mar. 11, 1996, at 8, available in
WESTLAW, CBCA Library [hereinafter Looming Labour-Policy Showdown].
173. See IL
174. See Id
175. Evenson, supra note 171. "[Right-to-work laws] will send a signal that
B.C. is open for business," says Fazil Mihlar, an analyst for the Fraser Institute.
Id. Looming Labour-Policy Showdown, supra note 172.
176. Id. According to Fazil Mihlar of the Fraser Institute, 78% of the
certifications granted in 1995 were granted to companies with 30 employees or less.
Id.
177. Id.
178. See Nakivell, Tilting Towards Unions, supra note 6.
179. Diane Francis, Civil Libertarians Where Are You?, FIN. POST, Aug. 3,
1993, at 9.
180. Bert Hill, Jocelyn Dumais Proves One Man Can Make a Difference,
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 28, 1993, at C1O.
181. Id.
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Dumais sought a deregulation of the Quebec construction indus-
try."8 The Quebec government, under intense pressure from the
Ontario government (which was upset at the minimal number of
permits issued to Ontario contractors), relented, and deregulated
the construction industry along the lines Mr. Dumais had advoca-
ted.1
5. Saskatchewan.-Last summer, fifteen Conservative
members of the Saskatchewan Parliament introduced several
pro-business bills, including right-to-work legislation.1 4 Premier
Roy Romanow called this an attempt to turn Saskatchewan into an
"Alabama North."1" 5  Conservative minority leader Bill Boyd
instead called this an attempt to reproduce the success of Alberta
in Saskatchewan by improving the climate for job creation."
The measures have not been adopted as of December 1996.
6. Manitoba.-Manitoba has long had some of the strongest
pro-union labor laws in Canada.1" Since winning re-election in
1995, however, the provincial Conservatives have introduced
measures aimed at limiting the ability of unions to collect dues
from non-member employees."8 The Labour Relations Act has
already been amended to increase the percentage of union
authorization cards to sixty-five percent to qualify for automatic
certification without a vote.' 9 Very recently, the majority intro-
duced Bill 26 - The Labour Relations Amendment Act."l This
Act would require a certification vote in all circumstances,
regardless of the number of authorization cards collected. 91 The
Act would also require strike votes, when requested by the
employer, to be conducted by the Minister of Labour, in order for
182. Id.
183. Id. The Ontario government had threatened to close the entire province
to all Quebec builders if Quebec did not change its restrictive policies permitting
construction firms. Id.
184. See Tories Want to Turn Saskatchewan Into Alberta, CANADIAN PRESS
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 2, 1996, available in WESTLAW, CBCA Library.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 47-55; Nankivell, Tilting Towards Unions, supra note 6.
188. See Errol Black, The Manitoba Government Declares War on Workers and
Trade Unions, CANADIAN DIMENSION, Sept. 19, 1996, at 18, available in
WESTLAW, TRD&IND Library.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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a union to strike."9 Unions would also be requested to disclose
their financial statements to nonmembers and the employer. 93
No union would be required to disclose this information to
nonmembers, but if the union chose not to comply with such a
request, it would lose the right to unilaterally impose the Rand
Formula on the nonmembers." Bill 26 would require unions to
consult with each employee in every workplace to explain to the
employees how, and if, union dues are used for political purpo-
ses.195 If the employee objected to the use of his or her dues for
these political purposes, the employees would have the right to
divert that portion of his or her dues to a charity instead.96
Critics of Bill 26 claim that it attempts to emulate the results
in the Beck decision, and has been heavily influenced by consul-
tants based in U.S. right-to-work states.1" The fate of Bill 26 is
yet undecided. This bill is undoubtedly a response to growing
nationwide discontent with the ability of unionized firms to
compete with companies based in other jurisdictions in North
America. As a result, Bill 26 focuses on the ability of unions to
enforce membership as a target of reform.
III. The Outlook for the Future of Union Security Agreements
in Canada
It certainly appears that the legal efficacy of closed and union
shops and the Rand Formula in Canada will not be altered by
judicial action for some time. Their use has been defended against
legal attacks based on the Charter's guaranteed right to associ-
ate19 and the right of freedom of religion'' across Canada. It
seems unlikely that constitutional challenges will become more
successful in the future.
192. Id. Both members and nonmembers could participate in these strike votes,
and ratification votes of collective bargaining agreements. Id.
193. Black, supra note 188. Unions would be required to disclose all financial
statements, including compensation statements of its officers, to the Minister of
Labour. Id.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Id.
196. Id. Political purposes would include not only donations to established
parties, but also expenses incurred in any form of advertising connected with an
election. Id.
197. Id.
198. See cf. Lavigne v. Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union; Canada (Treasury
Board) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada [1987] 28 L.A.C. (3d) 38 (Can.).
199. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
1997]
618 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3
Politically, however, the landscape of Canadian labor law
appears fluid, particularly at the provincial level where changes are
often rapid and substantial." While the federal government
governs only a small portion of the country's union workers, its
policies often provide a signal to both foreign investors and
provincial governments.2 1 For now, the federal Liberals seem
intent on pursuing a pro-union agenda, opposed to the notion of
right-to-work laws or any other labor law reform.' This course,
some predict, will inevitably lead to an increase in the cost of doing
business across Canada and therefore create a strong disincentive
to invest in Canada.2 3 Curbing union power is seen by many as
the only way to increase Canadian competitiveness.'
Provincial change seems more imminent. Canadian labor
lawyer Michael Lynk has attempted to predict the future of
Canadian labor law in the Free Trade Era.'° Mr. Lynk believes
that state-against-state "bidding wars," now common in America,
will spread to the Canadian provinces, as those provinces attempt
to lure investment and jobs by providing "an attractive business
market."'  Provincial leaders, accustomed to economic competi-
tion between Canadian provinces, must now begin trying to
compete with American and Mexican states. Labor laws, which
have been largely equalized between provinces, allowing no one
province to enjoy a significant edge over the others, are suddenly
placing all the Canadian provinces at a competitive disadvantage
with many other states in North America.2' In order to compete,
political, business, and intellectual leaders will increasingly push to
equalize their own province's labor laws with the rest of North
America. This movement is already beginning in Nova Scotia,
British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan.2 8
The prospect for future changes is boosted by studies that
indicate that adjusted income in right-to-work states in the U.S. is
200. See Mai, supra note 15.
201. See Nankivell, Tilting Towards Unions, supra note 6.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Ferri, supra note 120.
206. Id.
207. See Nankivell, 'Right to Work' Laws, supra note 6.
208. See Ferri, supra note 120. Mr. Lynk also predicts that the minimum wage
Will fall across Canada as those provinces compete with U.S. states for capital
investment. Id
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higher than the adjusted income in non-right-to-work states.209
The public fear of right-to-work legislation derives primarily from
the possibility of lower wages in the sectors in which unions now
collectively negotiate on behalf of individual employees; Alberta
NDP Leader Ross Harvey claims right-to-work laws mean "a lower
standard of living for the worker and everyone else., 211 Wages
in right-to-work states do average CDN $1.45 per hour less than
wages in non-right-to-work states; some authors argue this wage
break amounts to a government subsidy for businesses in
right-to-work states. 2u However, in a study conducted recently
by economic professor James T. Bennett of all Standard Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (SMSA) in the United States, families residing
in SMSAs located in right-to-work states actually enjoyed a 2852
dollar advantage in average yearly income over families living in
SMSAs in non-right-to-work states. 212 The Fraser Institute and
other right-to-work lobby groups point to evidence such as this as
supporting the notion that economic competitiveness benefits all
members of society, not just big business and capitalists.213
IV. Conclusion
As the pace of North American economic integration quickens,
competitive forces will become an increasingly powerful influence
over state and provincial economic performance. Those economies
that include the optimum mix of legislative protections and
economic freedoms will not only allow their indigenous businesses
to outperform businesses located in other states or provinces, but
will also attract businesses looking to relocate from unsatisfactory
conditions elsewhere. Thus, the "laboratory of the states" will take
209. James T. Bennett, The Right to Work for Less?: Evidence From the U.S.
(visited Dec. 3, 1996) <httpJ/www.fraserinstitute.ca/EventslRightsToWork/bennett.-
html#Top>.
210. The Benefits of Right-to-Work, WESTERN REP., May 22, 1995, at 7.
211. Campbell, supra note 3. The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
suggests Canada should place a ten percent duty on all imports of American
manufactured goods to compensate for this "social dumping." Morton, supra note
107.
212. Bennett, supra note 209. Mr. Bennett arrived at the "yearly average
income" figure by subtracting state and local taxes from the absolute average
income for each of the 311 SMSAs, then factoring in the cost-of-living index
(calculated by the U.S. government and higher in virtually all non-right-to-work
states) for each SMSA. Id. The 129 SMSAs in right-to-work states averaged
$36,540 per year in family income, as opposed to a yearly family income of $33,688
for the 182 non-right-to-work SMSAs. Id
213. Id.
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on a continental meaning, pitting Manitoba against Nevada and
Quebec against Ixtapa. And, as argued above, those Canadian
provinces protecting closed and union shops, and either mandating
the Rand Formula or permitting unions to unilaterally impose it,
will be placed at a competitive disadvantage to their counterparts
in right-to-work states, forcing existing Canadian businesses to scale
back operations or relocate entirely. As observers, legislators, and
the public recognize this trend, more and more calls for
right-to-work laws, and other forms of labor law reform, will be
heard across Canada. Were one Canadian province to institute a
right-to-work law, the resulting boom in that province's economy,
similar to that experienced by Idaho, would cause a domino effect
in Canada, driving provincial parliaments throughout the country
to dismantle and abandon the current labor law regime and its
misguided protections for unions and their dues. The future of
Canadian labor laws is surging towards a relaxation of artificial
union protectionism, as all capitalist economies gradually return to
the competitive conditions that allowed the Industrial Revolution
to occur centuries ago.
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